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# Regional Political Power in Florida

by

Bradley J. Caouette

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Honors in Major Program in Political Science  
in the College of Sciences  
and in the Burnett Honors College  
at the University of Central Florida  
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term, 2016

Thesis Chair: Dr. Aubrey Jewett

## **ABSTRACT**

According to well-known political science professors in Florida universities, the only constitutional mandate to which the Florida Legislature must adhere is to pass a balanced budget (MacManus, Jewett, Bonanza, & Dye, 2015, p. 184). The process begins with each of Florida's state agencies crafting their individual budgets almost as soon as the new budget year takes effect (July 1). These budgets are submitted to the Governor's office where they are reviewed by staff and then ultimately submitted to the legislature (p. 243). During the budget process, legislators are careful to ensure that they procure state dollars, oftentimes referred to as "pork," for the constituents who elected them (p. 209).

The premise of this paper is to explore the possibility that political influence or power has a direct effect on the amount of tax dollars appropriated to Florida's 67 counties, 10 media markets, and in turn to Florida's three geographic regions. First, a legislative power index is developed. We then analyze county by county allocations of budget year 2016/2017 and the legislative power index to determine if there is a relationship between the amount of money distributed by county and the legislative influence that exists in that county. The research finds that the legislative power of a county as measured by the legislative power index had no statistically significant effect on per capita allocation. The presence of a state university and miles of roadway in a county did have an influence.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

First, I would like to thank Professor Jewett for taking a chance on a distance learning student with a project such as this, and for this opportunity to work with such a respected leader in the study of Florida Politics. I truly appreciate your guidance and suggestions throughout this process.

I would like to also thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Barry Edwards from inside the major and Dr. Amy Reckdenwald from outside the major. Your patience and kindness in going out of your way to facilitate this project by responding to the many requests for signatures is greatly appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Kerstin Hamann, Chair of the Political Science Department, for your responsiveness to all the signature requests just to get the approval to work on the project.

The interest and interaction you each have taken with this student is commendable, and I sincerely appreciate the investment you all have made in my academic career.

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## INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, Florida's political landscape has undergone a considerable transformation. This transformation has largely been geographical in nature, directly related to a shift in population from mostly rural North Florida to the more concentrated areas of Central and South Florida (Hill, MacManus, & Moreno, 2004). Early in Florida's history, the western panhandle was an area of notable political influence. A group of Democratic politicians controlled the legislative tenor of Florida's government much to the benefit of the panhandle region. These "porkchoppers" represented the rural counties of North Florida and often worked to protect their own self-interests with little concern for the regions of Central and South Florida (p. 129). The "porkchopper" influence continued into the 1960s until segregation was brought to a halt and the Supreme Court decided that reapportionment was the means necessary to ensure that political districts would have more equitable representation (pp. 104-105).

For nearly 60 years, from the early 1900s to the mid-1960s, the media markets of Panama City, Tallahassee and Gainesville were also contributing to the political dominance of the north. These media markets, along with Pensacola, comprised 22 counties and controlled the path Florida would follow. There was almost a dictatorial posture as elected leaders at all levels of government set much of Florida's policies and spent taxpayer dollars accordingly (p. 125).

Population was the largest factor for this political stronghold in North Florida. From 1900 to 1930, these 22 counties held a majority of Florida's population, with some estimates claiming nearly 70% (p. 126). However, as people began to migrate into Central and South Florida, the "porkchoppers" increased their efforts to retain political power (p. 129). Their



ideology was simple – keep state resources in North Florida at the expense of the needs of Central and South Florida. Indeed, as Florida’s population shifted further south, the “porkchoppers” became very intentional in their efforts to choke out the funding these areas needed to sustain a growing constituency (p. 129). Yet the influx of people into Central and South Florida proved to be too much to overcome, with reapportionment the last nail in the coffin for North Florida’s political dynasty, rendering this area of the state virtually inconsequential in state politics (p. 125).

Thus, the power once held in North Florida has been distributed to areas further south, but the “porkchopper” style of influence has not made the transition. In 2004, Kevin Hill and Dario Moreno authored a chapter in *Florida Politics: Ten Media Markets, One Powerful State* reporting that legislative influence in South Florida was not what one would expect. At that time, South Florida had the largest legislative delegation in Florida with one quarter of the state’s Representatives and nearly one third of the state’s Senators. Yet the legislative influence of South Florida remained compromised. Not only was the political influence not there, but state resources were lacking in South Florida as well, indicating a lingering bias in the legislature against the region for a number of years (pp. 271-272). In today’s legislative landscape, the Central Florida region, made up of the Tampa and Orlando media markets, has the largest legislative delegation (see Figures 1 & 2).




Figure 1: Legislator Distribution by Media Market  
Source: Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate




Figure 2: Legislator Distribution by Region  
Source: Florida House of Representatives and The Florida Senate

There has also been a considerable change in party control of the legislature over the years as well. Susan A. MacManus asserts that during the 1970s, Democrats held both U.S. Senate seats and controlled super majorities in both chambers of the Florida Legislature. Democrat Reubin Askew was Governor, and Democrats occupied all six cabinet positions (p. 14). However, after losing soundly in the 2002 elections, the Democratic influence bottomed out in spite of maintaining a higher percentage of party registrants. Republicans now found themselves with super majorities in both the House and the Senate (p. 14, fine print note) (See figure 3).




Figure 3: Legislator Party Shift  
Source: Florida House of Representatives and The Florida Senate

## **LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP/INFLUENCE**

During the 2016 Legislative Session, the Chairperson for nearly every committee was a member of the majority party. The three exceptions to this were all Senators – Senator Bill Montford, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture; Senator Eleanor Sobel, Chair of the Committee on Children, Family and Elder Affairs; and Senator Jeremy Ring, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Oversight and Accountability (The Florida Senate, 2016).

The role of Chairman is very significant, especially from a policy crafting perspective. Committee Chairs are responsible for determining which legislation will or will not be allowed to be presented in their committee. Recent examples of this control are found in Representative Charles McBurney, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Senator Miguel Diaz de la Portilla, chairman of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. Both men singlehandedly killed controversial legislation by refusing to place a bill on any agenda for their respective committees. Chairman McBurney refused to hear legislation regarding Stand Your Ground reform that had been defeated earlier in another House committee but was brought back to life through the Senate and sent back to McBurney's committee (Mitchell, 2016). Chairman Diaz de la Portilla sat on a key piece of legislation regarding campus carry which had already passed through the House by a significant margin (Sarkissian, 2016).

State Representative Eric Eisnaugle drafted a plan in 2015 to decentralize the power in the Florida House, indicating the great influence leadership has in the day to day operation of the legislature. While his plan largely deals with dissipation of the Speaker's control and how that influence affects decisions made by committee chairs, Eisnaugle gives testimony detailing how

this power could be more evenly distributed among chamber leadership as well as discussion about how to make the minority party more relevant (Torres, 2015) . The point here is to demonstrate that there appears to be a tier structure for legislative power that influences behavior and outcomes in the Florida Legislature.

## **EFFECT ON ALLOCATIONS**

This research explores the possible effect that legislative power has on funding allocations as applied on county by county, media market and regional levels. The hypothesis considered is that areas of Florida with demonstrably more legislative power receive increased levels of funding. Because each legislator's district is equally apportioned according to population, and not geography (Morris & Morris, 2014), it stands to reason that regions and media markets with greater populations would receive greater appropriations. Conversely, we could expect areas with sparser population densities to receive lower appropriations.

County by county allocations were considered for this project as published by the Florida House of Representatives (Florida House of Representatives, 2016). This publication is generated based upon the actual Conference Report for the General Appropriations Act as passed by the 2016 Florida Legislature. Included in this report are dollars that are associated with specific counties, as well as several multicounty programs. Additionally, this report includes allocations for certain transportation projects plus various grant allocations such as cultural and library funding and the Florida Recreation Development Assistance Program. Monies associated with DEP projects are also included in the report. It should be noted that K-12 Education funding, otherwise known as FEFP (Florida Department of Education, 2016), and money that comes to the counties through state agencies are not included in the report (Florida House of Representatives, 2016).

Legislative power for this project was determined by creating a new geographic legislative power variable, or Legislative Power Index (LPI). This index was developed by

assigning a value to each legislator based upon the position they held in the legislature (See Table 1). The logic behind the scoring is as follows. While each member of the legislature has some power to affect legislation, those in the minority party have less influence than those in the majority party. Therefore, members of the minority party received one point and members of the majority party received two points. Speaker pro tempore and president pro tempore as well as majority and minority leaders each were assigned 4 points because of their influence on the chamber floor emphasizing their respective party's position. Committee chairmen received 5 points due to their influence in the committee process of setting agendas that permit or restrict legislation from advancing. Appropriations Committee chairmen received 7 points since their committees help determine the overall budget. Finally, the Speaker of the House and the Senate President both received 8 points because they control much of what happens in the legislature. This LPI was then calculated by adding the appropriate values together for each county based on the number of and position held by any legislator representing any portion of that county. A full listing of the counties and their associated LPI can be found in Table 2.

The average LPI score for all counties is 16.5. Miami-Dade County has the most legislative power with a score of 78, followed by Hillsborough County (47), Orange County (40), and Broward County (39). The most powerful county in North Florida is Duval with a score of 28. At the low end of the scale, counties with the least amount of legislative power include Monroe (with the lowest score of just 3), Flagler and Putnam (4 each), Gadsden (5) and St. Johns (6).

By comparing and analyzing the Legislative Power Index with county by county allocations, it should be possible to ascertain whether the political influence in any given area of Florida reflects a greater amount of money for that area.

Table 1: Associated Legislative Roles Determining Legislative Power Index

<b>Position in the Legislature</b>	<b>Assigned Value</b>
Member of the Minority Party	1
Member of the Majority Party	2
Chamber Leadership	4
Committee Chairman	5
Appropriations Committee Chairman	7
Chamber Leader	8



Table 2: County Legislative Power Index Rankings

<b>County</b>	<b>LPI</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>LPI</b>
Alachua	13	Lee	28
Baker	10	Leon	12
Bay	11	Levy	7
Bradford	7	Liberty	10
Brevard	33	Madison	10
Broward	39	Manatee	21
Calhoun	10	Marion	30
Charlotte	24	Martin	19
Citrus	10	Miami-Dade	78
Clay	9	Monroe	3
Collier	29	Nassau	10
Columbia	10	Okaloosa	19
Desoto	16	Okeechobee	10
Dixie	7	Orange	40
Duval	28	Osceola	16
Escambia	14	Palm Beach	28
Flagler	4	Pasco	20
Franklin	10	Pinellas	28
Gadsden	6	Polk	29
Gilchrist	7	Putnam	4
Glades	14	Santa Rosa	9
Gulf	10	Sarasota	17
Hamilton	10	Seminole	14
Hardee	16	St. Johns	6
Hendry	10	St. Lucie	28
Hernando	12	Sumter	17
Highlands	19	Suwannee	10
Hillsborough	47	Taylor	10
Holmes	9	Union	7
Indian River	17	Volusia	19
Jackson	9	Wakulla	10
Jefferson	10	Walton	9
Lafayette	10	Washington	9
Lake	26		

## RESEARCH ANALYSIS

Examining the raw data, it is clear that there is significant difference in the money received on a regional level. Looking at the dollars received per capita, the North Florida region received \$1,139 per person, twice as much money as Central Florida (\$569), and slightly over twice as much as South Florida (\$548) (see Figure 4).




Figure 4: Per Capita Dollars Received - Regional

Source: Florida House of Representatives

Surprisingly, the Legislative Power Index for each region is nearly inversely proportional to the allocations received. The north region, made up of the Pensacola, Panama City, Tallahassee, Gainesville and Duval Media Markets only shows an LPI of 102, while the central and south regions reflect indexes of 241 and 222, respectively (see Figure 5).




Figure 5: Regional Legislative Power

At the media market level, there is also great disparity in the per capita dollars distributed. The extreme ends of the spectrum show the Gainesville market realizes \$3,454 per citizen while the Ft. Myers market sees only \$370 per person (see Figure 6). Figure 7 illustrates that again, there is somewhat of an inverse relationship between the legislator influence and allocations. An even greater disparity in the per capita allocations is seen at the county level - \$4,262 in Alachua County as compared to \$96 in Charlotte County. A full listing of all county's revenue per capita can be found in Appendix "A".




Figure 6: Per Capita Dollars Received - Media Market  
Source: Florida House of Representatives




Figure 7: Media Market Legislative Power

The scope of this research considered the effect that legislative power has on these differences in per capita dollars each county receives. Using SPSS data analysis software, three

different models were analyzed to determine if any such relationship existed. The dependent variable for each model was the county by county allocations. The first model consisted of a bivariate regression directly evaluating the LPI effect on allocated dollars per capita, with the LPI as the independent variable. Hypothesis 1 is that there is a positive relationship between allocated dollars per capita and the LPI. If politics is a factor, we would expect that counties with more power in the legislature should receive more state money. Surprisingly, this regression indicated that there was little or no relationship between the two. Results of the first model analysis are seen in Table 3. The model shows almost no variance is explained (R Square of just .009) and that the LPI variable is not statistically significant and has a negative coefficient, which is opposite the expected direction.

Table 3: Bivariate Regression

<b>Ind. Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Significance</b>
Total LPI	-5.090	-0.093	6.737	0.453
Constant	783.959		138.873	0.000

R Square = 0.009      Adjusted R Square = -0.007

The second model considered the effect of other demographic and environmental factors in addition to the LPI. These additional independent variables included majority party influence, population density, poverty, household income, Hispanic and black populations, the presence of a state university (State University System of Florida, Board of Governors, 2016) and the number of road miles (transportation projects) in each county (Florida Department of Transportation, 2016). As in the bivariate regression, LPI is expected to have a positive

relationship with allocated dollars per capita. The expected relationship for each of the other control variables is detailed below.

Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of Republican registered voters and per capita allocated dollars. Since Republicans control the state legislature, it makes sense that counties with more Republicans might receive more money.

Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between population per square mile and per capita allocated dollars. Counties with higher density might be expected to receive more money per capita.

Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of residents in poverty and per capita allocated dollars. It is possible that there is some redistribution of dollars to counties with high numbers of people in poverty.

Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between median household income and per capita allocated dollars. Wealthier counties may exercise more influence over the legislature resulting in more money coming to their area.

Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between Hispanic population and per capita allocated dollars. While Hispanics are a large and fast growing demographic group in Florida, with the exception of Cubans in South Florida, they have typically lacked political power.

Additionally, many Hispanics in Florida lack citizenship and cannot participate in the political process. Finally, Hispanics have been voting more Democratic in the past several elections as more Puerto Rican voters move to Florida and younger Cuban voters begin to abandon the Republican Party (Lopez & Stepler, 2016). Thus, overall, the expectation is that counties with large numbers of Hispanics will receive less money.

Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between black population and per capita allocated dollars. Black citizens are among the most reliable supporters of the Democratic Party and so a Republican legislature could be expected to send less money to counties with high numbers of black residents.

Hypothesis 8: Counties that are home to a state university are likely to receive a higher per capita allocation of state dollars than counties without a university. Because the county by county allocations specifically include money for higher education (Florida House of Representatives, 2016), it follows that counties with state universities will receive more money.

Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between the miles of road in a county and per capita allocated dollars. Since the allocated dollars include money for transportation, it makes sense that counties with several roads might receive more money than counties with fewer roads.

Data for the demographic and socioeconomic variables is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. Registration data is taken from the Florida Division of Elections. State university location was verified with the State University System and road mileage comes from the Florida Department of Transportation.

Results of the second model are reflected in Table 4. This multivariate regression indicated that LPI and these additional factors accounted for 30% of the variance in county allocations with an adjusted R Square value of .307. Only two variables are statistically significant at the .10 level (although .05 is often used as a cut off, with a small sample like 67 counties we employ the slightly more generous .10 level in this research): state universities and road mileage. The LPI variable is again not statistically significant and again actually has a negative coefficient. Counties with state universities do receive a higher per capita allocation

than counties without an institution in the State University System. However, counties with more miles of roadway actually received less per capita allocation than counties with fewer roads.

Table 4: Multivariate Regression

<b>Ind. Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Significance</b>
Total LPI	-4.901	-0.090	13.807	0.7240
Republican %	-2.822	-0.040	11.871	0.8130
Population per sq. mile	0.220	0.174	0.190	0.2510
Poverty %	44.270	0.329	32.418	0.1770
Household Median Income	0.011	0.117	0.019	0.5800
Hispanic Pop. %	-0.747	-0.013	9.621	0.9380
Black Pop. %	4.314	0.059	11.542	0.7100
State University	1130.321	0.618	268.239	0.0000
Road Miles	-0.206	-0.437	0.122	0.0960
Constant	-308.216		1329.159	0.8170

R Square = 0.401      Adjusted R Square = 0.307

The third model isolated the effect that state university presence and transportation projects had on the county by county allocations. With state university presence and total highway miles per county as independent variables, about 30% of the variance in per capita allocation was still accounted for in Model 3, and both variables were statistically significant (see Table 5). As one would expect, this model revealed that state universities had a positive relationship to the county allocations. However, it was interesting to see that the number of road miles per county still had a negative relationship. In other words, the more road miles the county had, the less money they received (see Table 5). Possible explanations of this negative influence could be found in the nature of the projects – some might be bridge maintenance or replacement



rather than all out resurfacing or construction of new roads. It is also possible that small counties with fewer roads still needed to receive a certain amount of dollars to address basic infrastructure needs and thus on a per capita basis, rural counties received more transportation dollars.

Table 5: State University and Road Miles Regression

<b>Ind. Variable</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Significance</b>
State University	1321.451	0.722	243.750	0.000
Road Miles	-0.25	-0.531	0.063	0.000
Constant	941.361		117.761	0.000

R Square = 0.319      Adjusted R Square = 0.297

## CONCLUSION

The results obtained through this research indicate that the hypothesis suggesting that legislative power has an influence on county by county allocations is not supported. There is no demonstrable statistically significant relationship between the legislative power a county has as measured by the LPI and the amount of money that county receives. The same holds true when looking at the relationship at the regional level and by media market. This could possibly indicate that there is a higher level of transparency and accountability in today's Florida Legislature than there was in the 1960's and 1970's during the era of the "porkchoppers." This is good news for Florida taxpayers as it suggests that tax dollars are being distributed by a more rational and less political means. For instance, the presence of a state university that logically contributes to the determination of the amount of tax dollars disbursed to the counties. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that even though legislative power as measured by the index had no effect on allocation, the northern tier of Florida still received more money per capita than the far more populous (and politically powerful) central and southern regions of the state. This may indicate that the counties of the more rural panhandle still have basic service needs that require funding regardless of population. Or it may simply reflect that the several universities located in the region skew the overall per capita allocation.

This research was predicated on the amount of dollars distributed to the counties as listed in the Legislature's County by County Allocations (Florida House of Representatives, 2016) as generated by the General Appropriations Act. Future research may consider narrowing this field to Budget Issue Requests (Florida House of Representatives, 2016), otherwise known in the

legislature as “member projects”. These budget issues are required to be submitted through the legislator’s office, whereas some of the items found in the County by County publication are requests that are submitted directly by the municipality or other local government. While these requests may have the legislator’s name attached to them, the legislator may only have limited knowledge of the request, relying solely on what others tell them. Water projects and various grant requests are examples of some of the budget requests that may bypass the legislator’s office.

Future research may also consider assigning an additional value for calculating the Legislative Power Index representing the longevity a legislator has served in office. Freshman legislators typically have little experience in lobbying for various funding while legislators who are term limited may find themselves with not as much influence as they enjoyed during years 3-6 of their service.

Additional research might also include a broader scope of fiscal years. This research focused on the most recent budget process during a year of possibly one of the most controversial presidential elections ever. Some of these results may be affected by legislators being more cognitive of their reelection efforts than actually pursuing projects for their districts. Sampling across more fiscal years may produce a more accurate picture of how the money really flows throughout Florida.

## **APPENDIX A: COUNTY BY COUNTY ALLOCATION SUMMARY**

Florida's 67 Counties	# of Projects	Amt. Allocations	# Vetoed	Amt. Vetoed	Net # of Projects	Sub Total Allocations	Multicounty Allocation	Amt. Vetoed	Multicounty Sub Total	Total Allocations	Population	Per Capita \$
Alachua	59	1,108,977,160	3	3,050,000	56	1,105,927,160	2,009,982	15,757	1,994,225	1,107,921,385	259,964	\$ 4,262
Baker	5	1,991,711	0	-	5	1,991,711	818,717	-	818,717	2,810,428	27,420	\$ 102
Bay	31	133,288,748	0	-	31	133,288,748	-	-	-	133,288,748	181,635	\$ 734
Bradford	11	21,202,940	0	-	11	21,202,940	827,681	-	827,681	22,030,621	26,928	\$ 818
Brevard	90	275,226,635	10	25,962,044	80	249,264,591	574,254	-	574,254	249,838,845	568,088	\$ 440
Broward	207	853,347,501	37	9,031,000	170	844,316,501	6,456,505	-	6,456,505	850,773,006	1,896,425	\$ 449
Calhoun	8	13,396,740	0	-	8	13,396,740	427,448	-	427,448	13,824,188	14,462	\$ 956
Charlotte	14	17,549,440	1	1,000,000	13	16,549,440	38,278	-	38,278	16,587,718	173,115	\$ 96
Citrus	11	30,436,222	0	-	11	30,436,222	-	-	-	30,436,222	141,058	\$ 216
Clay	22	93,577,263	0	-	22	93,577,263	136,582	-	136,582	93,713,845	203,967	\$ 459
Collier	37	60,572,296	2	11,000,000	35	49,572,296	176,550	80,680	95,870	49,668,166	357,305	\$ 139
Columbia	10	22,890,605	0	-	10	22,890,605	2,208,172	-	2,208,172	25,098,777	68,348	\$ 367
Desoto	14	33,053,940	2	650,000	12	32,403,940	1,176,155	66,122	1,110,033	33,513,973	35,458	\$ 945
Dixie	5	9,017,063	0	-	5	9,017,063	523,483	-	523,483	9,540,546	16,203	\$ 589
Duval	100	517,351,300	7	5,250,000	93	512,101,300	2,006,315	268,245	1,738,070	513,839,370	913,010	\$ 563
Escambia	58	785,123,615	1	3,000,000	57	782,123,615	244,083	-	244,083	782,367,698	311,003	\$ 2,516
Flagler	21	17,576,169	2	700,000	19	16,876,169	119,502	-	119,502	16,995,671	105,392	\$ 161
Franklin	15	4,538,306	0	-	15	4,538,306	347,615	-	347,615	4,885,921	11,761	\$ 415
Gadsden	18	9,021,615	1	400,000	17	8,621,615	1,470,583	-	1,470,583	10,092,198	46,036	\$ 219
Gilchrist	9	4,129,323	0	-	9	4,129,323	524,295	-	524,295	4,653,618	17,199	\$ 271
Glades	9	4,538,848	0	-	9	4,538,848	404,699	-	404,699	4,943,547	13,670	\$ 362
Gulf	10	14,903,637	0	-	10	14,903,637	469,093	-	469,093	15,372,730	15,871	\$ 969
Hamilton	10	16,610,711	0	-	10	16,610,711	461,840	-	461,840	17,072,551	14,295	\$ 1,194
Hardee	17	20,240,317	2	800,000	15	19,440,317	840,738	-	840,738	20,281,055	27,502	\$ 737
Hendry	26	83,837,482	4	1,369,676	22	82,467,806	1,158,115	-	1,158,115	83,625,921	39,119	\$ 2,138
Hernando	18	37,442,107	1	200,000	17	37,242,107	26,383	-	26,383	37,268,490	178,439	\$ 209
Highlands	13	34,028,040	1	250,000	12	33,778,040	3,126,496	-	3,126,496	36,904,536	99,491	\$ 371
Hillsborough	130	998,344,750	11	6,725,000	119	991,619,750	3,793,816	799,791	2,994,025	994,613,775	1,349,050	\$ 737
Holmes	11	24,539,236	0	-	11	24,539,236	571,152	-	571,152	25,110,388	19,324	\$ 1,299
Indian River	26	25,899,912	1	150,000	25	25,749,912	14,326	-	14,326	25,764,238	147,919	\$ 174
Jackson	18	42,521,652	0	-	18	42,521,652	1,436,422	-	1,436,422	43,958,074	48,599	\$ 905
Jefferson	17	12,544,049	0	-	17	12,544,049	434,816	-	434,816	12,978,865	14,081	\$ 922
Lafayette	6	5,193,525	0	-	6	5,193,525	279,883	-	279,883	5,473,408	8,663	\$ 632
Lake	64	435,111,096	8	4,103,000	56	431,008,096	1,282,205	-	1,282,205	432,290,301	325,875	\$ 1,327
Lee	53	301,094,172	4	1,200,000	49	299,894,172	346,861	158,509	188,352	300,082,524	701,982	\$ 427
Leon	74	833,232,155	5	1,095,000	69	832,137,155	1,024,684	17,352	1,007,332	833,144,487	286,272	\$ 2,910
Levy	13	27,551,700	1	172,602	12	27,379,098	1,214,239	-	1,214,239	28,593,337	39,832	\$ 718
Liberty	5	7,517,356	0	-	5	7,517,356	246,236	-	246,236	7,763,592	8,331	\$ 932
Madison	9	19,930,836	0	-	9	19,930,836	544,078	-	544,078	20,474,914	18,408	\$ 1,112
Manatee	36	151,792,638	2	750,000	34	151,042,638	1,512,484	747,247	765,237	151,807,875	363,369	\$ 418
Marion	25	65,843,676	3	1,699,024	22	64,144,652	145,772	-	145,772	64,290,424	343,254	\$ 187
Martin	21	77,563,024	0	-	21	77,563,024	48,430	-	48,430	77,611,454	156,283	\$ 497
Miami-Dade	373	2,048,335,413	60	29,377,600	313	2,018,957,813	5,679,193	1,355,566	4,323,627	2,023,281,440	2,693,117	\$ 751
Monroe	38	85,352,599	1	100,000	37	85,252,599	4,195	-	4,195	85,256,794	77,482	\$ 1,100

Source: Florida House of Representatives

Florida's 67 Counties	# of Projects	Amt. Allocations	# Vetoed	Amt. Vetoed	Net # of Projects	Sub Total Allocations	Multicounty Allocation	Amt. Vetoed	Multicounty Sub Total	Total Allocations	Population	Per Capita \$
Nassau	21	63,320,499	4	2,308,000	17	61,012,499	76,360	-	76,360	61,088,859	78,444	\$ 779
Okaloosa	29	77,629,319	3	2,100,000	26	75,529,319	155,917	-	155,917	75,685,236	198,664	\$ 381
Okeechobee	12	20,735,722	0	-	12	20,735,722	1,172,299	-	1,172,299	21,908,021	39,469	\$ 555
Orange	125	1,114,177,329	11	10,761,485	114	1,103,415,844	2,047,245	747,392	1,299,853	1,104,715,697	1,288,126	\$ 858
Osceola	23	133,444,953	0	-	23	133,444,953	73,158	73,158	-	133,444,953	323,993	\$ 412
Palm Beach	154	727,556,543	17	11,919,000	137	715,637,543	3,519,801	86,239	3,433,562	719,071,105	1,422,789	\$ 505
Pasco	35	131,099,812	3	14,075,000	32	117,024,812	367,619	-	367,619	117,392,431	497,909	\$ 236
Pinellas	105	721,556,825	4	1,100,000	101	720,456,825	1,007,193	57,571	949,622	721,406,447	949,827	\$ 760
Polk	62	231,512,397	3	1,100,000	59	230,412,397	1,845,739	146,792	1,698,947	232,111,344	650,092	\$ 357
Putnam	25	54,061,831	1	200,000	24	53,861,831	2,482,220	-	2,482,220	56,344,051	72,023	\$ 782
Santa Rosa	17	22,057,225	1	250,000	16	21,807,225	-	-	-	21,807,225	167,040	\$ 131
Sarasota	61	125,122,615	1	250,000	60	124,872,615	2,300,031	756,268	1,543,763	126,416,378	405,549	\$ 312
Seminole	41	285,745,977	1	300,000	40	285,445,977	208,157	-	208,157	285,654,134	449,144	\$ 636
St. Johns	33	43,122,508	2	450,000	31	42,672,508	1,188,653	-	1,188,653	43,861,161	226,640	\$ 194
St. Lucie	37	118,650,543	2	672,500	35	117,978,043	472,075	-	472,075	118,450,118	298,563	\$ 397
Sumter	18	13,951,197	1	200,000	17	13,751,197	467,795	-	467,795	14,218,992	118,891	\$ 120
Suwannee	8	6,765,299	0	-	8	6,765,299	1,366,903	-	1,366,903	8,132,202	43,760	\$ 186
Taylor	9	13,541,080	0	-	9	13,541,080	664,817	-	664,817	14,205,897	22,493	\$ 632
Union	7	3,525,831	0	-	7	3,525,831	468,245	-	468,245	3,994,076	15,234	\$ 262
Volusia	52	140,401,025	6	2,576,000	46	137,825,025	802,128	176,378	625,750	138,450,775	517,887	\$ 267
Wakulla	23	25,335,637	0	-	23	25,335,637	973,789	-	973,789	26,309,426	31,535	\$ 834
Walton	18	36,936,917	2	800,000	16	36,136,917	58,713	-	58,713	36,195,630	63,508	\$ 570
Washington	17	24,157,429	0	-	17	24,157,429	738,072	8,408	729,664	24,887,093	24,687	\$ 1,008
State Total	2,699	13,520,646,036	232	157,096,931	2467	13,363,549,105	67,609,285	5,561,475	62,047,810	13,425,596,915	20,271,272	\$ 662

Source: Florida House of Representatives

## **APPENDIX B: MEDIA MARKET AND REGIONAL ALLOCATION SUMMARIES**

Florida's 10 Media Markets	# of Projects	Amt. Allocations	# Vetoed	Amt. Vetoed	Net # of Projects	Sub Total Allocations	Multicounty Allocation	Amt. Vetoed	Multicounty Sub Total	Total Allocations	Population	Per Capita \$
Pensacola	104	884,810,159	5	5,350,000	99	879,460,159	400,000	-	400,000	879,860,159	676,707	\$ 1,300
Panama City	133	301,800,021	2	800,000	131	301,000,021	4,294,751	8,408	4,286,343	305,286,364	388,178	\$ 786
Tallahassee	174	942,174,907	6	1,495,000	168	940,679,907	7,221,393	17,352	7,204,041	947,883,948	485,543	\$ 1,952
Gainesville	86	1,149,675,246	4	3,222,602	82	1,146,452,644	4,271,999	15,757	4,256,242	1,150,708,886	333,198	\$ 3,454
Jacksonville	255	838,620,657	16	8,908,000	239	829,712,657	10,332,447	268,245	10,064,202	839,776,859	1,737,406	\$ 483
Tampa	488	2,481,575,723	28	25,250,000	460	2,456,325,723	14,820,499	2,507,669	12,312,830	2,468,638,553	4,662,286	\$ 529
Orlando	438	2,463,901,888	40	45,601,553	398	2,418,300,335	5,600,714	996,928	4,603,786	2,422,904,121	3,935,258	\$ 616
Ft. Myers	153	500,646,178	13	15,219,676	140	485,426,502	3,300,658	305,311	2,995,347	488,421,849	1,320,649	\$ 370
West Palm	250	970,405,744	20	12,741,500	230	957,664,244	5,226,931	86,239	5,140,692	962,804,936	2,065,023	\$ 466
Miami	618	2,987,035,513	98	38,508,600	520	2,948,526,913	12,139,893	1,355,566	10,784,327	2,959,311,240	4,667,024	\$ 634
State Totals	2,699	13,520,646,036	232	157,096,931	2467	13,363,549,105	67,609,285	5,561,475	62,047,810	13,425,596,915	20,271,272	\$ 662


Source: Florida House of Representatives

Florida's Three Regions	# of Projects	Amt. Allocations	# Vetoed	Amt. Vetoed	Net # of Projects	Sub Total Allocations	Multicounty Allocation	Amt. Vetoed	Multicounty Sub Total	Total Allocations	Population	Per Capita \$
North	752	4,117,080,990	33	19,775,602	719	4,097,305,388	26,520,590	309,762	26,210,828	4,123,516,216	3,621,032	\$ 1,139
Central	926	4,945,477,611	68	70,851,553	858	4,874,626,058	20,421,213	3,504,597	16,916,616	4,891,542,674	8,597,544	\$ 569
South	1,021	4,458,087,435	131	66,469,776	890	4,391,617,659	20,667,482	1,747,116	18,920,366	4,410,538,025	8,052,696	\$ 548
State Totals	2,699	13,520,646,036	232	157,096,931	2467	13,363,549,105	67,609,285	5,561,475	62,047,810	13,425,596,915	20,271,272	\$ 662


Source: Florida House of Representatives




**APPENDIX C: TOTAL ALLOCATIONS AND POPULATION  
BY MEDIA MARKET AND REGION**




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




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
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
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
Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




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
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
Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau

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